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Abstract 
Media plays an important role in corporate debt financing decisions. However, no literature investigations the 
impact of media attention affect debt maturity structure. Based on the theories of asymmetric information and 
reputation, we use 5988 sample data of firms listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in the period 
2010-2014 and apply Heckman two-stage model to empirically test the impact mechanism of media coverage on 
debt maturity structure of listed companies. We explore the impact of media coverage on the debt maturity 
structure under different ownership nature. The results show that, favorable media coverage and debt maturity 
structure of listed companies are positive related. Favorable media coverage can increase the level of debt 
maturity structure of a listed company. Furthermore, unfavorable media coverage is negatively related to f debt 
maturity structure. Unfavorable media coverage can decrease the level of corporate debt maturity structure. 
Media coverage has a different impact on debt maturity structure with different nature of ownership. Specifically, 
with respect to state-owned enterprises, the impact of favorable media coverage on increasing debt maturity 
structure is more apparent on non-state-owned enterprises, and the impact of unfavorable media coverage on 
decreasing debt maturity structure is more apparent on state-owned enterprises. 
Keywords: Debt Maturity Structure, Media Coverage, Ownership Nature, Heckman Two-stage Model 
 
1. Introduction 
China's debt has become a world proposition, with the rapid rise of China's debt, especially the level of corporate 
debt1. Townsend Reuters ' latest survey results show that, the debt scale of Chinese corporate is 160% of GDP, 
has reached more than two times the scale of the U.S. corporate debt. At the present stage, Words such as "capital 
chain rupture, enterprise bankruptcy, insolvency, boss foot and so on” has been frequently reported on the news 
media, often to stimulate people's eyes and nervous. With the continuous deepening of the academic research on 
corporate debt, the research focus has shifted from the capital structure to the details of financing decisions, such 
as the debt maturity structure. Debt maturity structure is an important part of corporate financing decisions, is 
also the key content of the debt contract, which can directly affect the cost of financing and credit risk. Thus it 
can be seen that looking for the influence factors of the corporate debt maturity structure has important 
theoretical significance and practical value to improve the value of micro enterprises and promote the 
development of the macro economy.  
 
At present, there are two main factors influencing the debt maturity structure of enterprises (Gonzalez, 2015). 
First, macro environment: some scholars have discussed the influence factors of debt maturity structure of 
enterprises revolve around marketization(Sun et al,2005), legal environment(Xiao and Liap,2012), financial 
crisis(Gonzalez,2015), financial development(Kirch and Terrap,2012) and capital market 
development(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic,1999). Second, micro enterprises: some scholars from the growth 
opportunities(Johnson,2003), free cash flow(Xiao,2005), corporate size(Xiao,2005), corporate governance(Xiao 
and Liao,2008), agency conflicts(Lopez and Mestre,2015), security(Vig,2013) and other micro enterprise factors 
to find the influence factors of the debt maturity structure of enterprises. Under the catalysis of the information 
age, the influence of the media on the management of the listed companies is becoming more and more 
important. Media spread information to the public through the collection and analysis of processing, which can 
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reduce the information search costs of information users, and reduce the degree of information asymmetry. At 
the same time, the media can also conduct supervision of the listed companies, exposure the listed companies' 
illegal behavior, to help creditors improve their rights to protect their interests. There have been a lot of literature 
attempts to study the influence of media on the financing cost from the media perspective: Kothari, etc. have 
found that unfavorable news coverage will lead to an increase in the corporate capital costs and earnings 
volatility, favorable news will reduce the cost of capital(Kothari et al,2009). However, whether the media 
coverage can affect the corporate debt maturity structure? Whether the impact of different nature of media 
coverage on corporate debt maturity structure consistent? Whether the media coverage has a different impact on 
debt maturity structure with different nature of ownership? The theoretical have not given a clear answer of these 
problems. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
In recent years, a large number of academic literatures investigated the impact of the informal system on the 
company's financial behavior from the perspective of the informal system. For example, Zheng et 
al(2012)discussed the impact of national culture on the debt maturity structure from the cultural perspective. 
Cross-country empirical results show that the enterprises under the national culture of high uncertainty 
avoidance, high collectivism, high power distance and high masculinity prefer to use short-term debt. However, 
there has been no literature able to investigate the impact of the informal institutional factors on the corporate 
debt maturity structure from the perspective of media coverage. 
Media coverage as an important governance mechanism is a useful supplement to the lack of the system to a 
certain extent. Myers pointed out that the corporate debt maturity structure can effectively reflect the social 
contract. The longer of the debt maturity, the more uncertainty and risk will come. So the creditors pay more 
attention to the appearance of the performance mechanism (Myers, 1977). Media coverage helps creditors know 
about the performance of the company through information dissemination, reputation and other means. Because 
of the existence of the information asymmetry, the creditors cannot fully grasp the real information of the 
enterprise. Fang and Peress (2009) have confirmed the news media can reduce the information friction. Media 
through itself the function of the dissemination of information, through professional channels and means to 
collect and collate related information about enterprise, and dissemination of information through the media. It 
helps creditors to better understand the listed companies' real production and operation of the status quo improve 
the listed companies' information transparency, reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the listed 
companies and the creditors in virtually. Favorable media coverage of listed companies can deliver good news to 
the capital markets. Favorable media coverage can show that the enterprise has a positive social image, which 
has important significance for the performance of the debt contract. At this time, the creditors facing lower debt 
contract performance risk, so they prefer to provide long-term debt; on the contrary, if there are a large number 
of unfavorable media coverage of listed companies, which will deliver the bad news to the creditors. It will bring 
higher debt default risk to the creditors; the creditor is not willing to provide long-term debt at this time. 
Therefore, this paper puts forward the following research hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: favorable media coverage and debt maturity structure of listed companies are positive related. 
Favorable media coverage can increase the level of debt maturity structure of a listed company. 
Hypothesis 2: unfavorable media coverage is negatively related to f debt maturity structure. Unfavorable media 
coverage can decrease the level of corporate debt maturity structure. 
In the debt market, the risk of debt default is the key problem of the creditors. When the enterprise's debt default 
risk is higher, the creditors tend to provide short-term debt, and reduce long-term debt. In the countries of 
transition economies such as China, investor protection still exist many deficiencies and judicial system of 
creditor protection is not perfect. At this time, creditors prefer to provide credit funds to the debtor with a good 
reputation or economic strength. Due to the special "state owned" status of the state-owned listed companies, it 
provides credit guarantees and implicit financial support for its loans, and reduces debt default probability and 
non system risk of the debtor. But private enterprises are far greater than the state-owned enterprises in the 
difficulty of obtaining long-term debt in the debt market because there is no government guarantee. Media 
coverage can have an important impact on the reputation of the enterprise, favorable media coverage is 
conducive to the enterprise to establish a good reputation in the community, and unfavorable media coverage 
will damage the company's reputation. The impact of the media on corporate reputation will eventually be 
transmitted to the debt market. At this time, with favorable media coverage of the non state-owned listed 
companies help they get long-term debt due to a good social reputation. But the impact of favorable media 
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coverage on increasing debt maturity structure is less apparent on state-owned enterprises; the positive marginal 
impact of the media coverage on the debt maturity structure is smaller. Unfavorable media coverage can damage 
the reputation of the listed companies; this damage will be amplified due to the existence of the state-owned 
property. That is to say, the same unfavorable media coverage to damage the reputation of the state-owned listed 
companies is far greater than that the non-state-owned listed companies. Therefore, the impact of unfavorable 
media coverage on decreasing debt maturity structure is more apparent on state-owned listed companies than the 
non-state-owned listed companies. Therefore, this paper puts forward the following research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  Favorable media coverage has a different impact on debt maturity structure with different nature 
of ownership. With respect to state-owned enterprises, the impact of favorable media coverage on increasing 
debt maturity structure is more apparent on non-state-owned enterprises.  
Hypothesis 4:  Unfavorable media coverage has a different impact on debt maturity structure with different 
nature of ownership. With respect to state-owned enterprises, the impact of unfavorable media coverage on 
decreasing debt maturity structure is more apparent on state-owned enterprises. 
 
3. Sample and research design  
3.1 Sample  
This paper selects the data of A-share companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the period 
2010-2014 as the research object, in order to ensure the reliability of the results, we conduct the following 
screening: First, delete the ST or *ST listed companies by SFC; Second, delete financial listed companies; Third, 
delete missing financial data, corporate governance data of listed companies. The final sample is 5988. The study 
which relates to the financial data all come from Chinese financial database of Wind, corporate governance data 
from the sharp financial database, media coverage data mainly collected from China important Newspaper 
Database.( Hereinafter referred to as CCND) 
3.2 Variable definitions and measurement 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Debt maturity structure: in this paper, we use three kinds of measurement methods to choose the proxy variable 
of the debt maturity structure. First, debt maturity structure for DMS1, reference Sun et al(2005), who defined 
the debt maturity structure as long-term loans / total loans; second, debt maturity structure for DMS2, reference 
Datta et al(2005), who defined debt maturity structure as long-term debt / total debt, which long-term debt 
contains long-term loans, bonds payable, long-term accounts payable, other long-term liabilities, special payable 
and so on; third, debt maturity structure for DMS3,  reference Liu(2012), who defined the debt maturity structure 
as a long-term loans / total liabilities. 
3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
Media coverage MC: This paper use CNKI China important Newspaper Database as newspaper-based media 
data sources, according to the listed company stock code to collect manual data and judge the nature of the news 
reports. Favorable newspaper media coverage MCP is the annual number of favorable media coverage plus 1 and 
takes it the natural logarithm in CNKI China important Newspaper Database. Unfavorable newspaper media 
coverage MCN is the annual number of unfavorable media coverage plus 1 and takes it the natural logarithm in 
CNKI China important Newspaper Database. 
The nature of ownership: according to the nature of ownership of listed companies, this paper design the 
ownership of dummy variable PR, when the enterprise is state-owned ownership, PR is equal to 1, or PR is equal 
to 0. At the same time, this paper also design the cross term MC×PR between media coverage and the nature of 
ownership, it is mainly to investigate media coverage has a different impact on debt maturity structure of listed 
firms with different nature of ownership. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Referring to the related research from Huang et al(2016), González(2015)、Ben-Nasr et al(2015), this paper 
selects the enterprise scale, profitability, cash flow ability, agency cost, the audit institution type, equity 
concentration, growth ability, the scale of the board of directors, proportion of independent directors and the 
scale of the board of supervisors, the annual dummy variables and industry dummy variables. The specific 
variables are defined as shown in table 1. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and measures 
Types Variables Symbols Definitions and measurement 
Explained 
variable Debt maturity structure 
DMS1 long-term loans / total loans 
DMS2 long-term debt / total debt 
DMS3 long-term loans / total liabilities 
Explanatory 
variable 
Media coverage MC Including favorable media coverage MCP and 
unfavorable media coverage MCN 
Favorable media 
coverage MCP 
The annual number of favorable media coverage plus 
1 and take it the natural logarithm in CCND  
Unfavorable media 
coverage MCN 
The annual number of unfavorable media coverage 
plus 1 and take it the natural logarithm in CCND 
Ownership Nature PR Dummy variable, when the enterprise is state-owned 
ownership, PR is equal to 1, or PR is equal to 0 
Control 
variable 
Enterprise scale Size the natural logarithm of total assets 
Profitability ROE Return on net assets 
Cash flow ability CF Net operating cash flow / total assets 
Agency cost AC Other receivables / total assets 
The audit institution 
type BIG4 
Dummy variable, when the audit institution for the 
international top four accounting firms, BIG4 is 
equal to 1, or BIG4 is equal to 0 
Equity concentration EC The proportion of the first largest shareholder 
Growth ability GA increase rate of business revenue 
The scale of the board 
of directors BD 
Natural logarithm of the total number of the board of 
directors 
proportion of 
independent directors ID 
The ratio of independent directors to the total number 
of the board of directors 
The scale of the board 
of supervisors BS 
Natural logarithm of the total number of the board of 
supervisors 
Annual dummy 
variables Year 
Control the annual macroeconomic impact, set 4 
annual dummy variable 
Industry dummy 
variables Industry 
Control industry factors, according to the 
Commission in 2012 the new industry classification 
guidelines, set 17 industry dummy variables 
 
4. Model and estimation method 
In the field of media management, scholars have been plagued by the problem of endogenous. Heckman 
(1979) proposed the famous two-step estimation method, because its operation simple and does not rely on the 
normality assumption; it has gradually become the most popular method of solving sample selection bias. Based 
on the Heckman two-stage model, this paper constructs this model: 
The first stage, construct Probit estimation equation of newspaper media monitoring,  estimating the inverse 
Mills ratio IMR. The details are as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
=
            +
it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
DMC Size ROE Lev Value Q GA EPS DPS
AO BD ID BS EC Year Industry
α α α α α α α α α
α α α α α α α ε
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
      (1) 
Among them, DMC is two dummy variables of media coverage. When the variable of media coverage(MCP or 
MCN) is greater than median, the value is 1, otherwise 0.Control variables include firm size Size, profitability 
ROE, asset liability rate Lev, the company value Value, Tobin's Q, growth capability GA, dividend per share EPS, 
audit opinion AO, the scale of the board of directors BD, proportion of independent directors ID, the scale of the 
board of supervisors BS, ownership concentration EC, the annual dummy variables Year and industry dummy 
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variables Industry. 
The second stage, use the inverse Mills ratio IMR as control variable into the specific test mode. 
Investigate the impact mechanism of the media coverage on the debt maturity structure of listed companies.  
This paper builds the following model to test the impact mechanism of favorable media coverage on debt 
maturity structure of listed companies: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14
= 4
           +
it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
DMS MCP Size ROE CF AC BIG EC GA
BD ID BS IMR Year Industry
β β β β β β β β β
β β β β β β σ
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
     (2) 
Among them, the DMSit is the debt maturity structure of i company in t years, which included DMS1、
DMS2 and DMS3. MCPit is i company received favorable media coverage in t years. 
At the same time, to investigate favorable media coverage has a different impact on the debt maturity 
structure of listed companies under different ownership nature, this paper also constructs the test model as 
follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
= 4
           +
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it
DMS MCP MCP PR PR Size ROE CF AC BIG
EC GA BD ID BS IMR Year Industry
χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ
χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ ζ
+ + × + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
   
(3) 
    Among them, MCPit×PRit is the cross term for favorable media coverage and ownership nature, PRit is the 
nature of ownership of i company in t years. 
This paper builds the following model to test the impact mechanism of unfavorable media coverage on debt 
maturity structure of listed companies: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14
= 4
           +
it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
DMS MCN Size ROE CF AC BIG EC GA
BD ID BS IMR Year Industry
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ τ
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
      (4) 
Among them, MNPit is i company received unfavorable media coverage in t years. 
At the same time, to investigate unfavorable media coverage has a different impact on the debt maturity 
structure of listed companies under different ownership nature; this paper also constructs the test model as 
follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
= 4
           +
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it
DMS MCN MCN PR PR Size ROE CF AC BIG
EC GA BD ID BS IMR Year Industry
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ υ
+ + × + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
     (5) 
 
5. Empirical results and analysis 
5.1 Summary statistics 
From descriptive statistics results in table 2, we can see that average for DMS1 is 0.304, while the maximum 
value is 1, indicating that the enterprise's average long-term loans accounted for about 30% of total loans, but 
there are also some enterprise's debt financing are all long-term loans. The average value of the favorable media 
coverage MCP is 0.731, and the average value of the unfavorable media coverage MCN is 0.189. Because media 
coverage is the annual number of media coverage plus 1 and take it the natural logarithm, so we need to analysis 
the original data of media coverage to be aware of the condition of media coverage in real economic life. 
Statistics found that every listed company are reported in the newspaper every year by the number of 14.212 
times, the number of favorable media coverage is 3.166, while the number of unfavorable media coverage is 
only 1.360 in our country. 
At the same time, in order to ensure that there is no multiple linear problems between the main variables of this 
paper, this paper also carries out the Pearson correlation test and Spearman correlation test. Test results show that 
there exists a serious collinearity problem between debt maturity structure variables for DMS1,DMS2 and DMS3, 
correlation test values are greater than 0.9, but due to the debt maturity structure are the dependent variables and 
do not occur in the same regression model simultaneously, so it will not affect the conclusions of the paper. 
Limited space, this paper does not list the correlation test results. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
DMS1 0.304 0.168 0.338 0.000 1.000 
DMS2 0.271 0.115 0.103 0.000 0.730 
DMS3 0.119 0.048 0.160 0.000 0.859 
MCP 0.731 0.693 0.782 0.000 4.564 
MCN 0.189 0.000 0.404 0.000 2.996 
PR 0.660  1.000  0.474  0.000  1.000  
Size 22.316  22.185  1.425  13.076  28.509  
ROE 0.059  0.072  0.953  -54.809  4.485  
CF 0.036  0.038  0.181  -11.056  2.457  
AC 0.797  0.643  0.698  0.000  9.689  
BIG4 0.087  0.000  0.282  0.000  1.000  
EC 0.160 0.117 0.135 0.000 0.799 
GA 0.244 0.099 5.097 -1.000 367.532 
BD 2.521  2.485  0.306  1.386  3.738  
ID 0.347  0.333  0.097  0.000  0.750  
BS 1.610  1.609  0.447  0.000  3.045  
 
5.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of univariate analysis. It mainly examines the discrepancy of debt maturity structure 
among different media coverage samples. This paper mainly takes the average value of media coverage variables 
as the grouping standard. Take the favorable media coverage as an example, the samples which higher than the 
average value of the favorable media coverage are classified as the high MCP sample group, and the samples 
which lower than the average value of the sample are classified as low MCP sample group. Similarly, the 
samples which higher than the average value of unfavorable media coverage are high MCN sample group, while 
the samples which lower than the average value of unfavorable media coverage are classified as low MCN 
sample group. 
The A column of the table are the results of univariate analysis of favorable media coverage. Take debt maturity 
structure DMS1 as an example, the average value of the debt maturity structure of the high MCP sample group 
was higher than that of the low MCP sample group which was 0.076, and the T test of the discrepancy was 
significant at the 0.01 level. The median difference of the two groups of sample was 0.147; Wilcoxon rank sum 
test was significant at the 0.01 level. These can illustrate that companies which have higher degree of favorable 
media coverage tend to use long-term debts. The statistical analysis results of DMS2 and DMS3 also support the 
above statement, and then the research hypothesis 1 was confirmed. The A column of the table are the results of 
univariate analysis of unfavorable media coverage. Take Debt Maturity Structure DMS1 as an example, the 
average value of the debt maturity structure of the high MCN sample group was higher than that of the low MCN 
sample group, and the difference was -0.077 which was significant at the 0.01 level. Meanwhile, the median 
difference of the two groups of sample was -0.145, Wilcoxon rank sum test was significant at the 0.01 level. 
Thus it can be explained that less long-term debts are used by companies which have higher degree of 
unfavorable media coverage, then the research hypothesis 2 in this paper was confirmed. 
 
5.3 Media coverage and corporate debt maturity structure 
Table 4 is the regression results of the Heckman two-stage model of the impact of media coverage on debt 
maturity structure of listed companies, mainly analyzing the impact mechanism of different kind of media 
coverage on debt maturity structure. Take the regression results of debt maturity structure DMS1 as an example, 
the favorable media coverage MCP have a significant positive correlation with debt maturity structure at the 
level of 0.01, and the influence coefficient is 0.041. It can be illustrated that the favorable media coverage can 
help companies to get more long-term debt, so, the companies tend to use long-term debt, then the research 
hypothesis 1 of this paper was confirmed; the unfavorable media coverage MCN have a significant negative 
correlation with debt maturity structure at the level of 0.01, and the influence coefficient is -0.047. It can be 
illustrated that the unfavorable media coverage is not conducive to get more long-term debt for companies, so 
the research hypothesis 2 of this paper was confirmed. The regression results of taking DMS2 and DMS3 as the 
debt maturity structure also support the above conclusions, which can be illustrate that the conclusion of the 
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study is reliable. It is worth noting that the regression coefficient of Inverse Mills Ratios(IMR) of all the 
regression analysis in table 3 are mostly significant, this means that there are some sample self-selection 
problems in this research. Therefore, the estimate effect of using the Heckman two stage model was effective, 
using traditional OLS regression will cause biased error. 
 
Table 3. Result of univariate analysis 
A:Favorable media coverage MCP 
Variables 
High MCP Low MCP T test Wilcoxon rank sum test 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean difference T value 
Median 
difference Z value 
DMS1 0.354 0.267 0.278 0.120 0.076 8.325*** 0.147 82.721*** 
DMS2 0.083 0.040 0.065 0.015 0.018 6.425*** 0.035 64.042*** 
DMS3 0.137 0.073 0.110 0.032 0.027 6.143*** 0.041 58.068*** 
B:Unfavorable media coverage MCN 
Variables 
High MCN Low MCN T test Wilcoxon rank sum test 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean difference T value 
Median 
difference Z value 
DMS1 0.287 0.135 0.364 0.280 -0.077 -7.159*** -0.145 -60.125*** 
DMS2 0.068 0.020 0.083 0.041 -0.015 -4.435*** -0.021 -32.816*** 
DMS3 0.115 0.039 0.135 0.074 -0.020 -4.043*** -0.035 -33.545*** 
Note: ***, **, *, means significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, two-tailed test. 
 
5.4 Media coverage, ownership nature and debt maturity structure  
Table 5 investigate the impact of media coverage on the debt maturity structure of listed companies under 
different ownership nature, due to the limited space, here this paper mainly took the regression results of debt 
maturity structure DMS1 as the example. One aspect is the impact difference of favorable media coverage on the 
debt maturity structure of listed companies under different ownership nature. The favorable media coverage 
MCP has a significant positive correlation with debt maturity structure of listed companies at the level of 0.01. 
This is consistent with the previous analysis results. The cross term of favorable media coverage MCP and 
ownership nature (MC×NO) have a significant negative correlation with debt maturity structure at the level of 
0.01. Comprehensively speaking, the influential effect of favorable media coverage on the debt maturity 
structure of the listed companies which ownership nature is non-state-owned was 0.03. However, the influential 
effect of favorable media coverage on the debt maturity structure of the state-owned listed companies was 
0.016(0.03-0.014). This shows that compared with the state-owned listed companies, the impact of favorable 
media coverage on non-state-owned listed companies’ debt maturity structure is bigger, the research hypothesis 3 
of this paper can be verified. Another aspect is the impact difference of unfavorable media coverage on the debt 
maturity structure of listed companies under different ownership nature. The unfavorable media coverage MCN 
has a significant negative correlation with debt maturity structure of listed companies at the level of 0.01, and the 
influence coefficient was -0.031. The cross term of unfavorable media coverage MCP and ownership nature 
(MC×NO) have a significant negative correlation with debt maturity structure at the level of 0.01 and the 
influence coefficient was -0.022. This means that influential effect of unfavorable media coverage on the debt 
maturity structure of the listed companies which ownership nature is non-state-owned was -0.031. However, the 
influential effect of unfavorable media coverage on the debt maturity structure of the state-owned listed 
companies was -0.053(0.031-0.022). It shows that the impact of unfavorable media coverage on state-owned 
listed company’s debt maturity structure is bigger than non-state-owned listed companies, so the research 
hypothesis 4 of this paper can be verified. Meanwhile, the regression results of debt maturity structure DMS2 and 
DMS3 are consistent with the above, which shows that the research conclusion of this paper is robust. 
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Table 4. Regression results of Heckman model 
Variables DMS1 DMS2 DMS3 MCP MCN MCP MCN MCP MCN 
Constant -1.156
***
 
(-4. 777) 
-1.184*** 
(-4.880) 
-0.800*** 
(-10.457) 
-0.812*** 
(-10.563) 
-0.859*** 
(-7.364) 
-0.878*** 
(-7.492) 
MC 0.041
***
 
(4.671) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.138) 
0.018*** 
(6.507) 
-0.020*** 
(-5.772) 
0.026*** 
(6.261) 
-0.031*** 
(-5.612) 
Size 0.073
***
 
(7.686) 
0.073*** 
(7.625) 
0.038*** 
(12.726) 
0.038*** 
(12.612) 
0.045*** 
(9.709) 
0.044*** 
(9.621) 
ROE 0.027 (0.785) 
0.027 
(0.797) 
-0.026** 
(-2.465) 
-0.026** 
(-2.438) 
-0.023 
(-1.416) 
-0.023 
(-1.390) 
CF -0.013
***
 
(-3.183) 
-0.014*** 
(-3.191) 
-0.069*** 
(-3.007) 
-0.069*** 
(-3.008) 
-0.098*** 
(-2.795) 
-0.098*** 
(-2.798) 
AC -0.064
***
 
(-7.001) 
-0.064*** 
(-7.036) 
-0.024*** 
(-8.675) 
-0.024*** 
(-8.717) 
-0.044*** 
(-10.052) 
-0.044*** 
(-10.093) 
BIG4 -0.011
***
 
(-2.594) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.639) 
-0.032*** 
(-5.734) 
-0.032*** 
(-5.780) 
-0.037*** 
(-4.350) 
-0.038*** 
(-4.398) 
EC -0.089
*
 
(-1.929) 
-0.088* 
(-1.914) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.065) 
-0.044*** 
(-3.036) 
-0.028 
(-1.262) 
-0.028 
(-1.239) 
GA -0.007 (-0.922) 
-0.007 
(-0.964) 
-0.003 
(-1.359) 
-0.003 
(-1.418) 
-0.006* 
(-1.647) 
-0.006* 
(-1.692) 
BD -0.026 (-1.306) 
-0.026 
(-1.267) 
0.003 
(0.532) 
0.004 
(0.581) 
0.001 
(0.079) 
0.001 
(0.132) 
ID -0.063 (-1.103) 
-0.065 
(-1.134) 
-0.001 
(-0.063) 
-0.002 
(-0.105) 
0.013 
(0.451) 
0.011 
(0.410) 
BS 0.020 (1.559) 
0.020 
(1.578) 
0.005 
(1.236) 
0.005 
(1.258) 
0.005 
(0.851) 
0.005 
(0.874) 
IMR 0.009 (0.265) 
0.012 
(0.362) 
0.045*** 
(4.330) 
0.046*** 
(4.454) 
0.044*** 
(2.778) 
0.046*** 
(2.898) 
Year/Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Wald Chi2 1109.68*** 1102.98*** 1469.20*** 1450.38*** 1345.14*** 1330.91*** 
N 5988 5988 5988 5988 5988 5988 
Note: ***,**,*indicate significance at 1%,5%,10%, respectively; T value are shown in brackets; in order to save 
space, the first stage estimation results of the Probit model are not listed in this paper, but interested readers can 
email me for the details. 
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Table 5. Regression results of Heckman model 
Variables DMS1 DMS2 DMS3 MCP MCN MCP MCN MCP MCN 
Constant -1.180
***
 
(-4. 842) 
-1.201*** 
(-4.937) 
-0.810*** 
(-10.522) 
-0.817*** 
(-10.599) 
-0.872*** 
(-7.424) 
-0.884*** 
(-7.530) 
MC 0.030
***
 
(2.801) 
-0.031** 
(-2.416) 
0.011** 
(-2.109) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.743) 
0.019** 
(2.378) 
-0.022** 
(-2.077) 
MC×PR -0.014
***
 
(-2.740) 
-0.022** 
(-2.276) 
-0.009* 
(-1.829)   
-0.012** 
(-2.542)   
-0.009*  
(-1.745)   
-0.012 
(-1.025)   
PR 0.011
**
 
(2.431) 
0.002** 
(2.106) 
0.017** 
(2.072) 
0.010** 
(2.199) 
0.014* 
(1.893) 
0.006 
(0.914) 
Size 0.074
***
 
(7.722) 
0.073*** 
(7.666) 
0.038*** 
(12.710) 
0.038*** 
(12.600) 
0.045*** 
(9.721) 
0.044*** 
(9.632) 
ROE 0.025 (0.741) 
0.026 
(0.762) 
-0.025** 
(-2.384) 
-0.025** 
(-2.338) 
-0.023 
(-1.405) 
-0.022 
(-1.365) 
CF -0.012
***
 
(-3.159) 
-0.012*** 
(-3.161) 
-0.067*** 
(-2.956) 
-0.068*** 
(-2.954) 
-0.097*** 
(-2.760) 
-0.097*** 
(-2.761) 
AC -0.064
***
 
(-7.013) 
-0.064*** 
(-7.057) 
-0.025** 
(-2.384) 
-0.025*** 
(-8.819) 
-0.044*** 
(-10.095) 
-0.044*** 
(-10.138) 
BIG4 -0.010
**
 
(-2.569) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.614) 
-0.032*** 
(-5.756) 
-0.032*** 
(-5.805) 
-0.037*** 
(-4.344) 
-0.038*** 
(-4.395) 
EC -0.085
*
 
(-1.846) 
-0.085* 
(-1.842) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.070) 
-0.045** 
(-3.070) 
-0.027 
(-1.222) 
-0.027 
(-1.222) 
GA -0.007 (-0.918) 
-0.007 
(-0.958) 
-0.003 
(-1.332) 
-0.003 
(-1.391) 
-0.006 
(-1.623) 
-0.006* 
(-1.679) 
BD -0.025 (-1.261) 
-0.025 
(-1.230) 
0.003 
(0.473) 
0.003 
(0.507) 
0.001 
(0.078) 
0.001 
(0.119) 
ID -0.062 (-1.080) 
-0.064 
(-1.109) 
-0.001 
(-0.074) 
-0.002 
(-0.116) 
0.013 
(0.459) 
0.012 
(0.417) 
BS 0.020 (1.587) 
0.020 
(1.604) 
0.004 
(1.037) 
0.004 
(1.063) 
0.005 
(0.786) 
0.005 
(0.809) 
IMR 0.009 (0.268) 
0.012 
(0.367) 
0.045*** 
(4.378) 
0.047*** 
(4.498) 
0.045*** 
(2.799) 
0.046*** 
(2.917) 
Year/Industry Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Wald Chi2 1110.76*** 1104.29*** 1474.06*** 1455.76*** 1346.35*** 1332.17*** 
N 5988 5988 5988 5988 5988 5988 
Note: ***,**,*indicate significance at 1%,5%,10%, respectively; T value are shown in brackets; in order to save 
space, the first stage estimation results of the Probit model are not listed in this paper, but interested readers can 
email me for the details. 
 
5.5 Sensitivity analysis 
This article mainly take the following two methods of robustness test：On the one hand, we select other 
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measurement method of media coverage. According to CNKI Chinese important newspaper full text database, 
we take the eight important Finance and economics newspapers which are "China Securities News", "Securities 
Daily", "Securities Times", "Shanghai Securities News", "the 21st century economy report", "Chinese business 
newspaper", "economy observes a newspaper", "Financial Times" as the resources of the data of media attention 
and then we collected and summarized the listed companies' news reports; On the other hand, we remove the 
noise in the data of media coverage. In the data collection of media coverage, there may be some listed 
companies did not have the media reports, and then the media coverage variable is 0. The paper has the test again 
after deleting the samples which media coverage variable is 0. Results from the robustness tests show no 
significant difference from our previous findings. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The paper use 5988 sample data of firms listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in the period 2010-
2014 and apply Heckman two-stage model to empirically test the impact mechanism of media coverage on debt 
maturity structure of listed companies, and explore the impact of media coverage on the debt maturity structure 
under different ownership nature. The analysis results of this paper show that: Firstly. favorable media coverage 
and debt maturity structure of listed companies are positive related. That is favorable media coverage can 
increase the level of debt maturity structure of a listed company. Secondly, unfavorable media coverage is 
negatively related to debt maturity structure of listed companies. Unfavorable media coverage can decrease the 
level of corporate debt maturity structure. Thirdly, favorable media coverage has a different impact on debt 
maturity structure with different nature of ownership. Specifically, with respect to state-owned enterprises, the 
impact of favorable media coverage on increasing debt maturity structure is more apparent on non-state-owned 
enterprise. Fourthly, unfavorable media coverage has a different impact on debt maturity structure with different 
nature of ownership. Specifically, compared with the non-state-owned enterprises, the impact of unfavorable 
media coverage on decreasing debt maturity structure is more apparent on state-owned enterprises. Future 
research could focus on the impact of media on debt financing costs. This is an interesting research topic; it can 
help companies find effective ways to reduce the cost of debt financing. 
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Notes 
Note1: Reference on New China official homepage: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/newchina/index.htm  
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/02/c_135405884.htm) 
 
